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INDUSTRY VIEW OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
Stephen A. Wakefield*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Kent Frizzell asked me a couple of months ago if I would
come here and discuss the administration's energy policy, I gladly ac-
cepted and thought that this would be a great opportunity for me really
to rip into everything I thought this administration was doing wrong in
the energy area. However, on reflection of what happened in the past
two administrations, I had second thoughts. I think I should level
more of my criticism at what happened during these previous adminis-
trations, at least as far as it set the stage for a lot of what is happening
now.
The obvious area of criticism of the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions was the imposition of price controls and allocation regulations
over an industry which had not seen any such regulation in the past
through the creation of the Federal Energy Office which is now the
backbone of the Department of Energy. I think these measures can be
excused somewhat in that the Executive Branch was under a lot of
pressure from Congress to impose price controls and to impose alloca-
tion regulations. The response of Secretary of the Treasury, George
Schultz, to this was that the worst things the Nixon Administration did
were excused since otherwise Congress would have done something
worse. I do not know if that included Watergate, but it was certainly
true as to wage and price controls and other actions in the economic
area. The other major energy disaster of the Nixon Administration
was the establishment of the Federal Energy Office. Perhaps this can
be excused due to the emergency at the time, but I do not know if we
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needed to extend it and make a department of some twenty thousand
people a permanent fixture of the Washington scene. Having noted
these items, I think probably the worst thing that we did and the worst
thing that we bequeathed to the current administration and to the oil
industry was the two-tier crude oil pricing system.' I want to discuss
further the pricing of oil, crude oil in particular. But first, I would like
to comment on conservation measures discussed earlier.
II. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY MEASURES
I can agree completely that the United States, and indeed the
world, is in a serious energy situation. I think the differences in the
approaches to energy problems lie in the ends that we would like to see
achieved, and the means that we believe the country should use to go
about achieving those ends.
The cornerstone of the administration's energy policy is conserva-
tion. This is something which is claimed we can have here and now.
We used to talk about conservation a lot and implement programs with
signs on the highway that said, "Don't be fuelish" and other silly slo-
gans. Everybody believed it and agreed as long as they had a hard
time getting gasoline. When they had to wait in line, they did not
mind driving fifty-five miles an hour, but as soon as they were able to
get all the gasoline they wanted, and as soon as they got used to an-
other ten or fifteen cents per gallon at the pump, they put their CB's in
and got back up to seventy-five miles an hour.
We hear that the West Germans and Swedes have as high a stan-
dard of living as we do and yet use a lot less energy per capita. Al-
though their standards of living on an economic basis may be as good
or better, I would submit that their lifestyles are considerably different.
There are not many Germans who would drive a hundred miles from
the airport in Tulsa in order to have a meeting. The distances most
Germans are likely to travel are much shorter, and they probably
would go by mass transportation, except for the few who can afford to
get on the autobahns with their Mercedes. Thus, I think there are sig-
nificant differences, and you cannot say that the West Germans or the
1. For a summary of the two-tier system from its beginning in August, 1973 to the present,
see Crude OilPrices: Confusion Reigns Supreme, 186 WORLD OIL 71 (1978). More complete cov-
erage can be found in United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Regula.
tion of Domestic Crude Oil Prices, Publication No. 95-8, March, 1977. See also Langdon, FEA
Frice Controlsfor Crude Oil andR6fned Petroleum Products, 26 ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW
AD TAx. 55 (1975); Wakefield, Allocation, Price Control and the FF4: Regulatory Policy and
Practice in the PoliticalArena, 1975 RocKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 257.
[Vol. 13:723
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Swedes do a better job of conserving their energy than we do, because
it is an irrelevant comparison between totally different worlds. We
have one of the largest countries in the world and, particularly west of
the Mississippi River, we have large distances to drive and frequently
no other means of transportation than private automobiles.
We can turn our thermostats down, we can lower our speed limits,
but we can only go to that well once. Turning down the thermostat a
little more with every crisis or price rise will not continue to be a realis-
tic solution.
I think we have to have conservation. I think it has to be impor-
tant, but I do not think it is the only answer or even the primary answer
to our problem. If the administration were really serious about cons -
vation as the primary answer, it would let prices rise to market levels so
that people would slow down their consumption. "Economics I'
teaches that when commodity prices are permitted to rise, supply and
demand become equal with supply increasing and demand decreasing.
This administration will not allow this because it is afraid somebody
might make a profit.
Everybody agrees that we have to use coal more, but many ques-
tions arise concerning coal as a substantial part of our energy base.
One of those questions is how we would endure a lengthy coal strike if
coal were still providing about fifty percent of energy in this country, as
it had provided after World War II. It appears to me that this adminis-
tration is having about as much success in dealing with the coal strike
as we did in getting the Arabs to end their embargo in 1973 and 1974.
The strike is causing a lot of those people who converted from coal to
oil and gas twenty years ago to remember that they converted because
they could not rely on the United Mine Workers to provide them with
a steady coal supply.
III. PRESENT ENERGY POLICY
When we talk about other new exciting energy forms which may
or may not come to fruition, I think we have to recognize that implicit
in the Carter Administration's National Energy Program is the concept
that the government knows best; that the people in Washington are
able to make better choices than we can as to the kinds of fuels we
should use. The administration's philosophy is that regulators are bet-
ter able to make decisions than the marketplace. I do not believe that
government planners are better able to make decisions concerning fuel
supplies than people in the business world who have a profit motive in
1978]
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putting together programs which will produce energy which consumers
will buy.
I submit that regulations are what got us into our energy problem,
and I do not believe that more government regulation will get us out of
it. One of Dr. Schlesinger's main themes is that the oil industry does
not like regulation now, but it did like it in the past when the price was
low and going lower, and the industry wanted government regulation
to support and stabilize the price. I would ask Dr. Schlesinger in that
regard if he would have have preferred not to have had oil produced in
unlimited quantities in Texas and Oklahoma in the 1930's and virtually
poured on the ground when the price was ten cents a barrel, because
that was the alternative. Along the same lines, he should consider if he
would have preferred not to have had a mandatory oil import program
which was approved by four Presidents, two Democrats and two
Republicans from 1959 to 1973. As a result, we would have had even
more of that cheap Arab oil at a dollar a barrel, and in return for that,
we would have seen the domestic industry recede even further than it
did. I submit that we would have had no development of the Outer
Continental Shelf, and that none would have taken the risks on the
north slope of Alaska that the oil industry did. Then what would have
been the impact of the Arab embargo in 1973, when we probably
would have had about half as much domestic production as we did. If
that is what Dr. Schlesinger is saying when he implies that these former
regulations were somehow evil or that they favored the oil industry and
were not in the national interest, I disagree with him.
Oil pricing, and the two-tier system,2 in particular, is the worst as-
pect of the entire program, and the worst thing that the Nixon Admin-
istration did in the whole price regulation area, except for price
regulations themselves.
The two-tier system was not objectionable in the beginning when
the difference between the regulated price and the then-unregulated
upper tier price was about twenty-five cents. But when prices went up
in late 1973, the price spread grew until the difference between the free
world price and the regulated lower tier price was two or two and a half
times that amount. This fostered the idea that since the old oil had
already been discovered, those costs were sunk and government had to
keep those prices down. This theory created a conflict between the
producers, who wanted to see as much of their production as possible
2. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 946 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 753-55, 757-60h) [herein-
after cited as EPCA].
[Vol. 13:723
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receive the higher tier price, and the regulators who wanted to achieve
just the opposite result.
When you add on top of the two-tier policy the abomination of the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1976,1 the situation that the oil
industry finds itself in today was perfectly predictable. I think that
position is characterized by a total lack of confidence in statements by
federal government officials, an inability to make any long-range plans,
and an uncertainty which pervades the industry and precludes the capi-
tal commitments that are necessary to develop supplies which are going
to be needed to meet United States energy needs.
Let me give you just a couple of specific examples of this. In Feb-
ruary, 1976, after Congress passed the EPCA, the FEA established a
price schedule for both tiers. This included a rollback as far as the
upper tier prices were concerned, which had not been regulated and
were now brought under regulation. But at least the rules were laid
out. However, those rules lasted for six months before we had another
rollback and a price freeze. The Ford Administration could have gone
to Congress and said they made a mistake in their calculations of these
prices. They could have said that the overcharges were not the pro-
ducers' fault-that the producers have not done anything wrong but
have priced their crude oil as we told them to price it. The administra-
tion did not do that, but instead ordered a rollback and a price freeze
which lasted until the end of 1977. The so-called "overcharges"
(which is a word used to shift the blame to industry when it was the
administration's fault) were finally repaid and a new schedule was put
out by this administration for a three month period.4 Three months is
too short a time to try to do any serious planning in developing an oil
field, but at least that is better than continued rollbacks and price
freezes.
One difficulty with that schedule was that it was not high enough
to permit industry to charge the prices that the law permits. We had a
law, passed by Congress under serious protest from the industry that it
was a disincentive that provided very nominal increases in prices, only
slightly higher than the ten percent annual inflation. Then this admin-
istration comes out with a new schedule which allows the producers the
rate of inflation, but denies them everything that Congress has allowed.
The resulting dollar amount has been, as of the end of January, 1978,
over one billion dollars that producers could have been permitted to
3. Id.
4. Crude Oil Price Schedule No. 9, 42 Fed. Reg. 62125 (1977).
1978]
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charge for their oil if the administration had permitted them the in-
creases provided by law.
Why has not the Carter Administration allowed prices to rise?
There are several theories on this. Depending on who you talk to in
the administration, you get different pictures, but a part of the answer
may be their legislative strategy, that this somehow is going to be held
out as a carrot to Senator Russell Long' and others to get the kind of
legislative program the Administration wants. The administration de-
nies that. Then there is the feeling, as expressed in Mr. Bardin's inter-
view with the Oil and Gas Journal last year,6 that producers are getting
too much money already. Under this theory, producers of old wells do
not have any costs any more, so it is really a gift to permit them to
charge $5.25 a barrel for that oil. The producers probably ought to
donate that production to the public. This theory fails to take into
account the increases in costs that have occurred over the last decade.
We have set up a situation in which the producers have put that money
in the ground under one set of assumptions, and now the government
says those assumptions have changed, but does not take into account
that producers need the capital that this production should generate in
order to put that money back in the ground and look for new oil and
new gas, at today's prices. There is one other possible theory for the
reduced price ceilings-the stated position of the administration. The
argument has been put forth by some officials that this margin, this
billion dollars or more, is necessary to permit higher prices for new and
unconventional supplies, such as enhanced recovery and new frontier
areas. This position does not cost the administration very much be-
cause, in the time frame we are talking about, there is not going to be
hny significant amount of oil produced from these unconventional
sources. The country faces long lead times on all of these projects, and
the capital is just not going to flow into them when the Department of
Energy sets up programs like they are proposing to do now on the en-
hanced recovery program.
Basically the administration proposes to let producers receive free
market prices for that increment which would not have been produced
if there had not had been an enhanced recovery project. That is not
much to begin with, because producers already get the upper-tier price,
5. Russell Long is U. S. Senator from Louisiana, and Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee.
6. David Bardin is Administrator of the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) of the
Department of Energy. For an interview with Bardin in which he expresses the aims of ERA, see
Bachman, Plice Seen Key to U. S. Regulatory Trend, 75 OIL AND GAs J. 74 (1977).
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so all the administration is saying is that the price will be increased
from the upper-tier price to the free world price, but that is just for that
increment. Unfortunately, it may be several years before a producer
knows whether there is even going to be any incremental production in
an enhanced recovery program. It must first be piloted to determine
whether it is going to work. For the risks the producer is taking, and
for the capital he is pouring into the ground, the administration is go-
ing to let him try to get a little bit more on this increment. But then the
administration is going to put a few strings on this that it can pull at
any time if it does not like what the producer is doing or the results that
he is getting. Under this kind of program, it is highly unlikely that
many producers are going to put much money into one of these
projects. So it is relatively inexpensive for the Administration to say
that it is going to let the prices of these unconventional supplies rise in
return for prohibiting the producer from receiving all that Congress
said he could get for his conventional oil and gas supplies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The bottom line in all of this is a situation in which there are not
many clear rules, but when there are rules they have not always been
articulated clearly. Now we see the Department of Energy interpret-
ing those ambiguous regulations, never giving the benefit of the doubt
to the industry, and applying those interpretations retroactively to the
first day of price regulations. I would submit to you that the only way
we are going to solve our energy problems in this country is for the
government to get out of the way as quickly as possible. Until that can
be done, I think we have got to have rules that encourage capital for-
mation and encourage capital expenditure, and we have to have rules
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